
Chief Justice to General: "I think I'll strike the usual order and go for a soup and sandwich instead."
General to Chief Justice: "You're fired."
In imposing emergency rule in Pakistan yesterday, Gen. Pervez Musharraf also purported to dismiss Pakistan's Chief Justice. The New York Times reports Musharraf as saying:
"Judicial activism had demoralized the security forces, hurt the fight against terrorism and slowed the spread of democracy. Obstacles are being created in the way of democratic process, I think for vested, personal interests, against the interest of the country.”
(Musharraf was referring to the recent judicial release of 61 persons accused of terrorist activities).
So just what is a "judicial activist"? Ilya Somin has posted some thoughts on "judicial activism" on The Volokh Conspiracy. I tend to agree with Ilya that activism is not a helpful label in the constitutional sphere: one can (while remaining otherwise philosophically coherent) think courts should strike down one parliamentary statute while showing deference towards parliament in considering a second statute. In other words, one person's judicial activism is another person's judicial common sense. "Activist", at least in the constitutional field, becomes an adjective for cases we don't like.
A case like Chaoulli makes this plain: jurists who had excoriated the Court for decisions such as Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act were suddenly delighted (as I was) with the Court's decision striking at the heart of exclusive state-provided health care, while those who might have been expected to support a less deferential court were unhappy with the outcome in that case.
Speaking as a private lawyer, it surprises me that the judicial activism debate has been restricted largely to the field of contitutional law where, as Ilya points out, the "activist" epithet is hard to apply in a consistent manner. In private law, it is much easier to use the term consistently: pick your norm (corrective justice, instrumental considerations, etc.) and then make your assessment of the case. (For this reason, I find it mildly irritating when public lawyers make facile remarks about how Donoghue v. Stevenson is an instance of judicial activism - for most private law scholars, and certainly for any private law scholar who views tort law as properly conforming to corrective justice, it is absolutely not an "activist" decision, as we would understand "activism" - that is, in the sense of being inconsistent with fundamental norms that we associate with tort law).
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